The relation between Brazil and Argentina never had a real stage of enmity. This, if we consider, for example, the categorization that Alexander Wendt made in 1999, in his famous book Social Theory of International Politics[1]. There were no wars among the two countries; there are not any now. There is also no arms race or trying to see who has a stronger and capable military command; neither is there a competition to see who has an atomic bomb first. In fact, in this last point, both Nations cooperate in an active way, in relation with the nuclear energy. And they must continue in that sense. From one decade to the other the relations had passed from the constant economical exchange, concentrated in Mercosur, to more diverse aspects, now in debate in Unasur organization. The first, commercial, despite some turbulences, it is already a constant factor and mandatory -but yes, it need improvements-. It is not so present in this work. Mercosur as well Unasur, both, need more diplomacy, political improvement, and practical changes. But it is in Unasur where the innovations of the last decade are concentrated. And they must be there.
[1] Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
South America and International
Relations
 |
| Foto por Annadriel |
An Argentinian view
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Introduction
The relation between Brazil and Argentina never had a real stage of
enmity. This, if we consider, for example, the categorization that Alexander
Wendt made in 1999, in his famous book Social
Theory of International Politics[1]. There were no wars among the two countries; there are not any now.
There is also no arms race or trying to see who has a stronger and capable
military command; neither is there a competition to see who has an atomic bomb
first. In fact, in this last point, both Nations cooperate in an active way, in
relation with the nuclear energy.
Despite all of the above it doesn't mean that there is not a fragile
equilibrium to the incipient friend connection. Or the possibility to intensify
the friendship, in almost a brotherhood link. Could be that possible? This
paper won't be part of an attempt to answer the question directly, but could be
in train of starting the response indirectly.
Part of the conclusions reached in this work is that the more
significant cooperation between the countries is in nuclear, defense and
security matters; the change in the last field, from one decade to the other.
To
get an idea of the surroundings, it is important to remember that the two
principal extra-regional powers present in South American are the United States
and China. The dispute between them, in several areas, such as the diplomatic,
commercial, military and cultural arenas, is very important in order to
understand the changes in the region, and particularly in Argentina and Brazil.
We
are in a stage of power redefinition in world politics, altering policies
directed toward certain parts of the world. As it will become clearer in this
paper, relations among the countries remained stable in terms of economic,
commercial and diplomatic cooperation, and they were improving, but the realm
of defense and security proved most susceptible to change during this power
shift of the past decade.
Some academics make a clear distinction between two types of countries
in South America since the turn of the century: those that define some of their
political and economic goals as nationalist and populist and those that adhere
to free-market, neoliberal principles[2]. Argentina and
Venezuela are typically grouped into the first category, for example, which has
in recent years improved their mutual relations[3].
South America is caught in the middle of the game, financially and
monetarily, between the United States and China. And the intensification of the
afore-mentioned rivalry is more evident in some places, such as the South
Pacific basin. If businesses don't affect one another, they can collaborate in
the region, mitigating tensions and creating partnerships. The question to ask
then would be whether it is good for the South American countries or the world.
We can say that in security matters the Chinese-US rivalry could manifest
itself in South America as it did in South East Asia and the contiguous sea
lanes, with one superpower interfering in the neighborhood of the other.
South America is surely a priority objective for the communist country.
China's banks have lent enormous amounts of money to the region in the last
five years; for example, 20 billion dollars went to Venezuela in oil supply
contracts, and 10 to Brazil for similar reasons. Since 2009, China has become
the principal trade partner of Brazil. The dumping practices of Chinese
corporations in the region, which have become an enormous problem, are another
manifestation of this increased interaction[4].
In
the middle of this situation, Brazil and Argentina must develop the relation
each other. It could be seen that it has a sustain level of interaction during
both decades, the 1990s and the last one. The differentiation is also, instead,
in the level of significance. Before, Argentina giving more relevance to the
United States in several fields, not only the economical, and now more focused
in Brazil and the South American region.
Is
in that sense, also, the relation with Brazil moved from a central economical
perspective in the Argentina side to a more concrete neighbor in several
aspects.
The Southern Common Market (Mercosur for its Spanish) was created in the
1990s and it had achieved several goals. But the need of improvement in the
organization are urgent and mandatory.
Similar it is the case for the Union of South American Nations (Unasur
for its Spanish). It was created with the impulse of Argentina and Brazil and
the others important countries of South America in 2008, but it has lost its impulse
since the deaths of Néstor Kirchner, from Argentina, and Hugo Chávez, from
Venezuela. Also, recently, Lula da Silva from Brazil said no to the proposition
to manage the organization. The result is the continuous lack of a secretary
general.
1990s
The international
context at the beginning of the 1990s must not be forgotten to start the
understanding of some Argentinian foreign policies in the decade. Not to say
that it could have been different, but when Carlos Menem took office
(1989–1999) there was the international feeling or idea of “the end of history”[5], related with the end
of the Cold War, and the country was passing though an hyperinflation.
Argentina (and Brazil) were not alone in this adaptation. The whole Latin
American region, and its diverse countries, adopted commercial and economical
policies in the sense of that direction[6].
This tendency, certainly, and in a very clear way, affected the relation
among Argentina and Brazil. However, it can not be said that it was only part
of the governing elite and its ideas. A study of Montoya, Mora and Araujo, and
Di Rado[7], for instance, shows
the companion of the Argentinian public opinion in that judgment: deterioration
of the sympathy for the neighbors, including Brazil, and the belief that they
were better with the “world powers”.
As
a simple figure in a way of example, during the 1990s Brazil was still
something important for Argentina, but that place was nothing compared with the
“special” place the United States would have in the ideas of the local elite[8].
In the meanwhile, it could be said, the relation was almost exclusively
economical.
As
part of this assumption we could take the creation of the Southern Common
Market, in 1992, with the firm of the Treaty of Asunción (central capital of
Paraguay), signed by Carlos Menem, in Argentina, and Fernando Collor, in
Brazil. Later, with the firm of the Treaty of Ouro Preto, in 1994, the
organization received the first group of important editions. This is, in
essence, a commercial and financial organization; different, as it will be
mention in other part of this paper, with the relation in other areas covered
by a new institution.
Mercosur wouldn't be possible neither without the first endorse in 1985
between the formers presidents Raúl Alfonsín (Argentina) and José Sarney
(Brazil). They signed the Integration and Economics Cooperation Program. In
papers, the embryo of what later would become Mercosur. An association with a
lot of ideas but few practical steps in the course of the years.
By
defining the globalization cycles in the attempt to reach more understanding
about the global situation in connection with the Argentinian foreign policy,
one could consider, for instance, the work of Francisco Corigliano[9]. In that line the
1990s would be in the sixth period of globalization (1991-2001). It was already
mentioned that this period coincided with Menem's administrations -a candidate,
by the way, who won his elections with demagogical speeches and false discourse
from the left; later it was the contrary-. His immediate adaptations to the new
economical reality implicated experimental liberalization, or neoliberal, with
notorious inclination to the right.
It
was in those first years of the nineties that the political scientist Carlos
Escudé worked as the principal advisor of chancellor Guido Di Tella. Escudé
presented in 1992 his book Peripheral Realism: theoretical bases for a new
Argentinian foreign policy, where he presented some of the ideas that would
have a lot of influence in some of Menem's political decisions, letting Brazil
in second term behind the United States.
In
its favor we could say that the overlap to the dominant power made the country
safer during those years in certain areas, for example, in matters related to
Defense and Security. The military policy was also concentrated in that sense,
when, for instance, taking the preponderance in the role of accompaniment to
the United Nation missions; Argentina participated in 22 of those missions
during Menem's rule. But even more directly when it was answering the call of
duty in military interventions such as the Persian Gulf[10] (1991) and Haití
(1994). According to the administration of the term in the 1990s, those actions
would help to improve the country's image in the eyes of the West.
In
that sense Brazil didn't needed so much effort as Argentina. Historical friend
of the United States, even participating with troops in the Second World War,
with more democratic tradition, and with a lot of commercial ties: From the turn of the century until the
1970s, the United States and Brazil had what was described as “special
relationship”. Brazil was the United States closet ally in the region, and the
United States in turn provided Brazil with economic and military aid[11].
That it is not exactly in that way in the present. But the tradition is still
there.
This sequence also matches with the cycle that Roberto Russell named as
the Temporal victory of the liberal paradigm[12], that includes the
years between 1989 and 2001, highlighting, as it was mentioned, the approach
with the North American neighbor, from the Argentinian side as the Brazilian
one.
Furthermore, the cycle has its South American side, with certain
advances in Mercosur organization[13], with better
commercial relations between Argentina and Chile -that arrived to extraordinary
numbers-, and with Brazil. The other side of this coin is that in the same way
there were regressions in that sense. Russell also remarks that the approaches
to Brazil never had the same level as the intentions towards the United States
in that decade for Argentina, and that those kinds of decisions generated
costs. In the face of that advance the regional block was left without “the
necessary coat of arms protection, political and strategical”. Mercosur finally
suffered from a freezing point in the 1990s final years.
2001-2010
There is a certain consensus about wether to take the September 11
attacks to the World Trade Center as the beginning of a new international
cycle. And it is like that certainly not only in the international relations
field. Moreover in other subjects such as communication, with the definitive
expansion of Internet as an information source. That day would give a strong
impulse to the United States' crusade against the “terrorists” of the world.
In
accordance with Roberto Russell, the possibilities after the financial crisis'
irruption were certainly the following: the completely folding to the United
States, in a similar way to what was done in the 1990s, or to try to be closer
to the Brazilian brotherhood without letting go of the US hand. This after the
fall of Fernando de la Rúa government.
Eduardo Duhalde, in his transitory presidency, leaned more to the second
option, towards good relations with Brazil, specially with the then president
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Duhalde, however, took a lot of precautions to avoid
any type of conflict with the US. The country needed a back up to try to reach
a deal with the International Monetary Fund. Since 2002 that deal was achieved.
The economical air coming from Brazil was something central to the
recovery of the Nation, to reach a more complete restoration. That success was
also fundamental to improve the South American relations in general. The new
Argentinian president, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), maintained certain
similarity with his predecessor in the relation with Washington; above all in
the beginning of his presidency: masked speeches of discrepancy and joint
actions in important subjects for the United States -this last matter would be
permanent in the following years, besides the increasing tension with more
aggressive speeches against the North America.
A
big weakness of the Argentinian foreign policy of those years, beyond some good
decisions, is the lack of professionalism in the application during the term.
Besides, the relation with Brazil, while with great advances and with the wind
in favor because of Lula da Silva's presidency (2003-2010), it didn't reach a
stable level. In part, as Russell explains in his text, because of the
utilization that Argentina made with Venezuela to maintain the equilibrium, the
one thought -and now perhaps keeps thinking- as something necessary.
The foreign policy of the last decade is not clear and that shows, in
fact, some kind of weakness. The established plan doesn't match at all with the
past, and it is not easy to see if it will be broadly planned, in the State
level, to the future. The improvisation is part of the rule, it has its own
place; even though the result with that is sometimes close to the expectations,
it is not recommended. Mercosur, with the incorporation of Venezuela due, most
of all, to the Argentinian hand, and finally accepted by Brazil, remains with
the necessity of significant adjustments and with urgency.
The more important innovation of the last decade could be the creation
of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur for its Spanish). It is an
international organization created in 2008 as impulse to the regional
integration in matter of energy, education, health, environment,
infrastructure, security and democracy[14].
The creation of the institution could not be possible without the impulse from
Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner, besides the presidents of some other South
America countries.
There are some speculation about the objectives from Lula's
administration and Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign office, to impulse Unasur
during the Hugo Chavez' years in office. It could be related with the idea of a
more South Cone united instead of trying the Bolivar's ideas of a patria
grande, in the immense, heterogeneous and diverse region of Latin America.
For Brazil is to have a more secure regional zone, South America, to project
itself to the world with more strong bases of alliances[15].
Differentiation
in Defense and Security
It is important to remark, also, that Argentina, like
most of the South American countries, until the 1980s decade, had a defense
policy that was part of the monopoly for the military commands. And they had
inserted to them their own particular form of seeing the world[16], their ideological criteria, and their corporative
interest to gain money[17].
The principal
factor for change in South Americans' military policies was the National
Security Doctrine[18], applied most of all by the military regime between
1976-1983, in a kind of total war against communism and other internal “evil”
forces within the State: The development of an anti-subversive strategy that
in a big scale set aside the legal and moral parameters, and in the end
comprised one of the most significant cases of State terrorism in the region[19].
Related to
the industrial recuperation, in 2007 the Sub Secretary of Logistic and Planning
was created in Argentina. From there several new projects were established: the
Integral System of Integral Management of Investment for Defense (SIGID), a
tool to manage in a better way the decision progress in matters of decision on
investment; the Supply Joint Program of Common Inputs (PACIC), that helps to
connect the principal rulers in several contracts and services of permanent
use; The Joint Equipment for Peacekeeping Operations (PECOMP), to make
effective and utilize in advantage the United Nations refund in that sense, for
the given service; the Military Airworthiness Regime; the Political Budget
Committee. All of that doesn't imply that there are no more budget problems:
The reduction of Defense budget in Argentina
went from 1,88 per cent of its GDP in 1989 to 1,32 in 1993, and its remained
below 1,5 for several years[20].
That certainly contributed to the abandonment of capacities; not only in the
industrial sector, but also in the recruitment rates, the capacities for
instruction, and the officers' professionalism.
In the same
direction, Brazil has some budget problems for its Defense Ministry. In 2010,
for instance, the president Dilma Rousseff decided to cut off 50 billons of his
own currency, to restrict expenses and to control inflation. The Ministry of
Defense had a total of 4,5 billons of reales
that year. Brazil continues to expend some kind of 1,5 per cent of its GDP
-that, despite it is a major quantity of money that Argentina, still is
consider as insufficient for the country.
With this
limits, the cooperation in this matter among the two neighbors could be taken
as mandatory. And it has a lot of improvements since 2001. Is something
notorious if taking for instance both recent White Papers of Defense from both countries, in 2010 of Argentina,
and in 2011 of Brazil[21].
Then the cooperation is mentioned, in the sense of joint actions as the project
of developing an industrial base together. Also, it has been one of the central
improvements of Unasur.
Nuclear power
connection
One of the
most important relations between the two countries is in nuclear energy and
technology. Brazil and Argentina signed a mutual nuclear cooperation agreement
on November, 1990, starting in this way something that is now already a
tradition: the mutual assurance of nuclear development only with peaceful
objectives. It shows part of the ideas of regional importance that both
countries promotes, including the field of nuclear energy.
Signed in
Guadalajara, at the beginning it says: Recalling the commitments assumed
under the Joint Declarations on Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguazú (1985),
Brasilia (1986), Viedma (1987) and Ipero (1988), reaffirmed by the Joint
Statement of Buenos Aires of 6 July 1990. And after that, adding:
Believing that the benefits of all applications of nuclear technology should be
accessible for peaceful purposes to all States.
In a brief,
Brazil has two nuclear reactors in power, Angra 1 and Angra 2. Also it has one
under construction; with a total capacity in the country, for the moment, to
create 1896 MWe of energy . In the total capacity to create electricity, it
doesn't have a lot more than 3 per cent in nuclear utilities. Moreover, in the
papers, four more large reactors are in project, with speculation about 2020.
Argentina has two nuclear reactors, Atucha 1 and Embalse, with a capacity to
create 935 MWe; and with a third reactor in project for this year or the
next.
Brazil also has
a uranium production, 148 tonnes per year (or 400 tU/year). It has other ways
of producing and of getting energy: coal including lignite; crude oil and
natural gas liquids, oil shale, natural bitumen and extra-heavy oil; natural
gas, with proved recoverable reserves; hydropower with technically exploitable
capability.
The research
and development in the Brazilian nuclear energy field is also very large. It
has five centers, showing the interest of the State to continuing growing in
that sense, and the prospect to the future: IPEN from Sao Paulo; IEN and IRD in
Rio de Janeiro, CDTN in Belo Horizonte; CRCN in Recife; CRCN-CO in Goiania.
Plus, they have the investigation centers related with the Armed Forces: the
Navy Technological Center and the Air Force Institute of Advanced Studies and
the Army Technological Center.
South America
is a region full of natural sources and with a great potential for energy
production. Also it has people with the know how to use its nuclear energy,
especially in Argentina and Brazil, and the capacity for more development.
Because of that, this kind of treaty is also inscribed in the tradition of the
region about the peaceful utilization of nuclear material. It’s reaffirming the
principals of the region. This is related, likewise, to the Brazilian effort to
find a peaceful and diplomatic solution for the Iranian matter, and the
relation could be taken as an example[22].
A way to conclusion
The importance of the Malvinas subject is so central in Argentina that,
despite the administrations with different ideological backgrounds, it is
maintained as a principal factor for negotiations, firms of treaties, and
approaches to other countries. It is an item on the agenda that takes to a
large extent the attention and the effort, it requires a disproportioned level
of energy, leaving less space for other important matters in the national
foreign policy[23].
The point of the foundational myth about the territory's defense is part
of that dilemma. The necessity of national territorial defense in front of
possible external invasion. As Carlos Escudé tried to explain in his book Patology
of nationalism: the Argentinian case, the heritage of ideas of one Nation
with territorial amputations is very established in the majority of the present
population. In that time, for the book, the South American political scientist
made a collection of data from geographical manuals of primary and high school
education in the period 1879-1986, to get a sense of the grade of nationalist
education. Apart from this paper will stay that it should be said, if we want
to analyze nationalism, the differentiation between diverse types is mandatory;
there must always be one, controlled, managed with prudence, that could be very
useful for the State[24].
But territorial fears are part of the past
in what respect to the neighbors.
Héctor Timerman, foreign minister of Argentina since 2010 and before that
ambassador to the US, said clearly in some of his declarations, the country was
looking for other powerful allies to contra rest the historical weight of the
North Americans in the region and to be more and more adapted to the new world
board, with the sufficient space to get some autonomy.
“China
-Timerman said-, is the first emergent country to reach a position of relevance
that guarantees a representation that it will balance power relations in the
world. We had dedicated many hours and efforts to constitute a political
relation with Beijing with results that strengthen our global position”[25]. He is mentioning China
there, but he could mention Brazil in the same way.
But we can also think that China it's not
outside of the region in that sense neither. Argentina is the third country in
order from South America, if we take the numbers of military exchange visits
among 2001-2010 from there: Chile, 25; Brazil, 21; Argentina 17. And in that
sense, there is a differentiation between the countries still closer to Pentagon’s
ideas, as Colombia, Peru and Uruguay, and those closer to the Bolivarian idea,
as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina[26].
Brazil is somewhere in the middle.
The austral Nations are an example in that
insight; with possibilities of a big increase in the bilateral defense
relation. Outside of this study are the accomplishments of that relation, for
example in important matters for Argentina as the necessity of international
pressure in relation to the Malvinas Islands. But one could said that the
relation with Brazil and China could help in that sense, if well applied.
Also in the nuclear energy factor must be remember that the
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC) was created then in 1991 improving the reciprocal connection, and the
bond with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and in fact, with the
international community. The Agency was first organized after December 12 of
that year, when one Congress as well as the other passed the bill. The central
offices are in Rio de Janeiro, and from there they maintain a data base of
nuclear materials of both countries.
From one decade to the other the relations had passed from the constant
economical exchange, concentrated in Mercosur, to more diverse aspects, now in
debate in Unasur organization. The first, commercial, despite some turbulences,
it is already a constant factor and mandatory. Because of that it is not so
present in this work. Mercosur as well Unasur, both, need more diplomacy,
political improvement, and practical changes. But it is in Unasur where the
innovations of the last decade are concentrated. And must be there.
[2] Luna, Ricardo V., “The Americas and the
global crisis: a view from the south”, Princenton University, March 29, 2011,
p. 634.
[3] Monzón
Briceño, Claudio Alberto, “The foreign policy of Venezuela in the XXI century:
between the autonomy and the subordination to the global capitalism”, Cuadernos
sobre Relaciones Internacionales, Regionalismo y Desarrollo, Vol. 6, No. 12,
July-December 2011.
[4] Luna, Ricardo V., “The Americas and the
global crisis: a view from the south”, Princenton University, March 29, 2011,
p. 639.
[5] The idea that came from the US political
scientist and economist, Francis Fukuyama, with his famous book, The end of
history and the last man, in 1992.
[7] Mora
y Araujo, Manuel; Di Rado, Graciela; Montoya, Paula, “La política exterior y la
opinión pública Argentina”; La política
exterior Argentina en el nuevo orden mundial, Roberto Russell editor,
Flacso, Buenos Aires, 1992, pp. 219.
[8] Russell,
Roberto; Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel, El lugar de Brasil en la política exterior
argentina, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Argentina, 2003, p.53.
[11] Crandall, Britta, “Ally or rival?”, The United States and Latin America after
the Cold War, Crandall, Russell (editor), Cambridge University Press, p.
157.
[12] Russell,
Roberto, “La Argentina del Segundo Centenario: Ficciones y realidades de la
política exterior”, Argentina 1910-2010.
Balance del siglo, Buenos Aires, in Russell, Roberto (editor), Aguilar,
Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara, 2010, p. 273.
[16] Russell, Roberto, “Sistemas de
creencias y política exterior argentina: 1976-1989”, in Serie de Documentos
e Informes de Investigación N° 204, by FLACSO / Argentina, Buenos Aires,
July 1996, p. 47.
[17] Derghougassian,
Khatchik, “Evolución de la política de defensa”, La defensa en el siglo XXI,
Argentina y la seguridad regional, Capital Intelectual, p. 14.
[19] Argentinean
Model for the Modernization of the Defense System, Argentina Defense
Minister, Buenos Aires, 2009, p. 12.
[20]
Derghougassian, Khatchik, “Evolución de la política de defensa”, La
defensa en el siglo XXI, Argentina y la seguridad regional, Capital
Intelectual, p. 25.
[21] Also it is
described in the Annual of regional
security in Latin America and the Caribbean 2012, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
en Colombia, Hans Mathieu and Catalina Niño Guarnizo (editors), November 2012.
[23] Cassese, Nicolás,
“¿Seduciendo lo imposible? La estrategia argentina sobre Malvinas”, Agenda
Internacional magazine, Nº 3, December 2004 / January - February 2005, p. 84.
[24] Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel, “Defensa de un
nacionalismo prudente”, Clarín newspaper, May 10, 2013.
[25] “Guidelines
of Argentinean Foreing Policy”, Página/12 journal, October 12, 2011.
[26] Malena, Jorge, “The peace and security
segment of the white paper of China in relation with Latin America: analysis of
results and mentions in the bilateral military relation”, Virtual Simposio,
2012.
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